| Case | Rule | Holding / Significance |
|---|
| A |
| Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974) |
FRE 801(d)(2)(E)
(Co-Conspirator Statements) | - Under the second foundational requirement for 801(d)(2)(E), the co-conspirator statement must also be made during the course of the conspiracy. [218-19]
- “The ongoing conspiracy requirement is … inapplicable to evidence, such as that of acts of alleged conspirators, which would not otherwise be hearsay” when offered “to prove the existence of the conspiracy.” [219]
- Statements were non-hearsay when offered “to prove that the statements were made so as to establish a foundation for later showing, through other admissible evidence, that they were false.” [220 (footnotes omitted)]
|
| Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - “Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause does not” apply in civil forfeiture proceedings [608 n.4 (citing United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 481 (1896) (“The sixth amendment relates to a prosecution of an accused person which is technically criminal in its nature.… So the clause … has no reference to any proceeding … which is not directly against a person who is accused, and upon whom a fine or imprisonment, or both, may be imposed.”))]
|
| B |
| Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Question Presented: "[W]hether petitioner was deprived of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him at his trial in Oklahoma for armed robbery, at which the principal evidence against him consisted of the reading of a transcript of the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who at the time of trial was incarcerated in a federal prison in Texas" [720]
- Reversing where government failed to show unavailability of witness: "We start with the fact that the State made absolutely no effort to obtain the presence of Woods at trial other than to ascertain that he was in a federal prison outside Oklahoma." [723]
- Holding: "The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. While there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable, this is not, as we have pointed out, such a case." [725-26 (footnote omitted)]
|
| Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988) | FRE 803(8) (Public Records and Reports)
see also FRE 106 (Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements)
FRE 401 (Definition of "Relevant Evidence") | - Resolving a "longstanding conflict" and holding that public investigative reports under FRE 803(8)(C) "are not inadmissible merely because they state a conclusion or opinion." [170]
- "As long as the conclusion is based on a factual investigation and satisfies the Rule's trustworthiness requirement, it should be admissible along with other portions of the report." [170 (footnote omitted)]
- On a separate issue, jury "was given a distorted and prejudicial impression" of a letter where trial court restricted cross-examination concerning the letter and the jury was denied "a more complete picture of" the communication. [170] Because the completeness-information was relevant under FRE 401, it was unnecessary to decide whether FRE 106, codifying the rule of completeness, applied. [172]
|
| Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, _ U.S. _, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) | FRE 201 (Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts) | -
In civil antitrust class action complaint attributing a partial statement to a chief executive officer about competiting with other companies, noting that "the District Court was entitled to take notice of the full contents of the published articles referenced in the complaint, from which the truncated quotations were drawn. See Fed. Rule Evid. 201." [n.13]
|
| Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause)
FRE 801(d)(2)(E) (Co-Conspirator Statements) | - Holding that where the requirements of FRE 801(d)(2)(E) are satisfied, no Confrontation Clause issues are raised
- Clarifying that the proponent holds the burden to show the admissibility of the FRE 801(d)(2)(E) evidence by a preponderance of the evidence [182-84]
|
| Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Holding that a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights were violated when a non-testifying codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant is introduced at their joint trial, despite the judge’s jury instruction that the confession was only to be considered against the codefendant. [126]
|
| Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (June 23, 2011) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Holding that the surrogate testimony of a second forensic analyst, who did not observe or review the original blood alcohol content results, was inadmissible; specifically, the defendant has the right "to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, tocross-examine that particular scientist."
- Further background information on the case is available on the Bullcoming v. New Mexico Resource Page
- See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
|
| C |
| Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) | Harmless Error Standard | - Holding that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" [24]
- See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7, 15 (1999) (under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the court reviews "whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained") (quotations omitted)
- See also Delaware v. Van Arsdale, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (remanding to Delaware Supreme Court to determine whether Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
|
| Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Confrontation clause provides the criminal defendant a right to "confront" face-to-face any witnesses giving evidence against him at trial [1019-20]
- Use of a screen between defendant and child sexual assault victim during victim's testimony violated defendant's confrontation clause rights because the screen allowed the witness to avoid viewing the defendant during the victim's testimony [1020-22]
|
| Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Landmark Confrontation Clause case holding that "testimonial" statements of an unavailable witness violated the Confrontation Clause unless there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination
- Leaving open the definition of "testimonial" evidence but noting "testimonial" statements at minimum includes statements made to law enforcement officials engaged "in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial" such as "affidavits, custodial examinations, . . . affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." [51, 56 n.7]
- Supreme Court overturned precedent that had been applied for nearly a quarter of a century, including Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (applying "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" standard to admit statements of an unavailable witness)
- See also Lead Story: After Crawford v. Washington: Early Observations On the Admissibility of Evidence Under the Confrontation Clause, 1 Fed. Evid. Rev. 83 (Sept. 2004)
- See also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)
|
| Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - “We hold that, where a nontestifying codefendant's confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant, the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even if the defendant's own confession is admitted against him.” [193 (citation omitted)]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
|
| D |
| Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 128 S.Ct. 1029 (2008) | FRE 403 (Exclusion of Relevance on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time); FRE 401 (Definition of "Relevant" Evidence) |
- While Crawford v. Washington, as a new constitutional rule, does not apply retroactively in federal proceedings, state courts are not constrained in adopting broader new criminal rules that apply in state proceedings
|
| Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) | FRE 702 (Testimony by Experts) |
- FRE 702 imposes a "gatekeeping" role for trial court to admit expert scientific testimony, including that expert evidence is not only relevant, but reliable and assists trier of fact
- Concluding FRE 702 displaced "general acceptance" to admit expert testimony under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923)
- See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extending Daubert to technical and other specialized expert testimony)
|
| Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Question Presented: "[W]hether the Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant in a criminal case be allowed to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-examination directed at possible bias deriving from the witness' probationary status as a juvenile delinquent when such an impeachment would conflict with a State's asserted interest in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile adjudications of delinquency." [309]
- "Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i. e., discredit, the witness. One way of discrediting the witness is to introduce evidence of a prior criminal conviction of that witness. By so doing the cross-examiner intends to afford the jury a basis to infer that the witness' character is such that he would be less likely than the average trustworthy citizen to be truthful in his testimony. The introduction of evidence of a prior crime is thus a general attack on the credibility of the witness. A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand." [316]
- Holding: "On the basis of the limited cross-examination that was permitted, the jury might well have thought that defense counsel was engaged in a speculative and baseless line of attack on the credibility of an apparently blameless witness or, as the prosecutor's objection put it, a 'rehash' of prior cross-examination. On these facts it seems clear to us that to make any such inquiry effective, defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." [318]
|
| Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Victim's response to 911 operator's interrogation was not "testimonial" and not subject to Confrontation Clause because the statement was made under circumstances that objectively indicated an ongoing emergency and the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable police to assist in meeting that emergency [823]
- Victim's written statements in affidavit given to police officer were testimonial and excludable under the Confrontation Clause because no emergency existed at the time of the statement and the primary purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a past crime [830]
- A defendant who obtains absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits Confrontation Clause rights, noting FRE 804(b)(6) (Forfeiture by Wrongdoing) [833]
- See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
|
| Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (per curiam) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- "This Court's Confrontation Clause cases fall into two broad categories: cases involving the admission of out-of-court statements and cases involving restrictions imposed by law or by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination." [140]
- In considering limitations placed on cross-examination, “the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities [such as forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion] through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the fact finder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' testimony.” [22]
- Confrontation Clause was not violated by expert witness who could not recall the basis for his opinion
|
| Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) (“Doe II”) | Fifth Amendment (Privilege Against Self-Incrimination) | - Question Presented: "[W]hether a court order compelling a target of a grand jury investigation to authorize foreign banks to disclose records of his accounts, without identifying those documents or acknowledging their existence, violates the target's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." [202]
- Completion of a consent directive was not testimonial under the Fifth Amendment "because neither the form, nor its execution, communicates any factual assertions, implicit or explicit, or conveys any information to the Government." [215]
|
| Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990) | FRE 404(b) (Other Crimes, Wrongs, Or Acts) | - Evidence concerning robbery, introduced at first trial and resulting in an acquittal, was admissible under FRE 404(b) in subsequent prosecution for bank robbery and did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Due Process Clause [348-49]
- Noting “the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case” and the relevance of evidence offered under FRE 404(b) was governed by a lower standard of proof than required for conviction
|
| Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) | Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) | - "[H]old[ing] that the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" [619]
|
| E |
| Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) | Fifth Amendment (Privilege Against Self-Incrimination)
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) | - Question Presented: "whether the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments require suppression of a post-arrest confession, which was obtained after Edwards had invoked his right to consult counsel before further interrogation" [478]
- "[W]e now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights." [484]
- "We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." [484-85]
- Because the right to counsel applies to custodial interrogation, "nothing in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would prohibit the police from merely listening to [an individual's] voluntary, volunteered statements and using them against him at the trial." [485]
- As a result of the disposition, declining to "decide Edwards' claim that the State deprived him of his right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments...." [480 n.7]
|
| Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) | Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) | - Federal habeas review of a state court second-degree murder conviction was not available to consider a challenge to the admission of prior injury evidence to establish battered child syndrome under state law absent a violaiton of a constitutional right. [67-68]
- "In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." [68]
- "The evidence of battered child syndrome was relevant to show intent, and nothing in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State to refrain from introducing relevant evidence simply because the defense chooses not to contest the point." [70]
|
| F |
| Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) | FRE 501 (Attorney-Client Privilege) | - The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is "to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys." [403]
|
| G |
| General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) | FRE 702 (Testimony by Experts) | - Holding "that abuse of discretion is the proper standard by which to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence." [141]
|
| Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) | Fifth Amendment (Privilege Against Self-Incrimination)
Sixth Amendment (Right to Counsel)) | - The taking of handwriting exemplars did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. “A mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside its protection. No claim is made that the content of the exemplars was testimonial or communicative matter.” [266-67]
- “The admission in-court identifications without first determining that they were not tainted by the illegal lineup but were of independent origin was constitutional error.” [272]
|
| Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- The forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause requires the government to show that "the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying"
- Case was remanded to apply appropriate standard
|
| Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Redaction of co-defendant’s confession by replacing a proper name with a blank space or the word "deleted" violated the Bruton rule as the jury could conclude the redactions refer to the defendant
|
| H |
| Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) | Work Product Doctrine | - A common companion to attorney-client privilege is the work product doctrine which safeguards “[m]aterials obtained or prepared by an adversary’s counsel with an eye toward litigation.” [511]
- See also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (work product rule: noting “the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation”)
|
| Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) | Fifth Amendment (Privilege Against Self-Incrimination) | - Arrest and conviction for refusing to provide identity during a stop pursuant to a state “stop and identify” statute did not violate the Fifth Amendment since "disclosure of his name presented no reasonable danger of incrimination." [189]
- "In this case petitioner’s refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it 'would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute' him." [190 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951)]
- "Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances." [191]
|
| Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause or Compulsory Process Clause) (meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense)
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense)
FRE 403 (Exclusion of Relevance on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time) | - Evidence rule barring the defense from introducing proof of third-party guilt on the basis of the strength of the government’s case “violates a criminal defendant’s right to have ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” [331 (other citation omitted)]
- Also noting: “While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 403.” [326 (other citations omitted)]
|
| Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) | FRE 404(b) (Other Crimes, Wrongs, Or Acts)
FRE 104(b) (Relevancy Conditioned On Fact) | - Resolving a circuit conflict and holding the trial court need not "make a preliminary finding before 'similar act' and other Rule 404(b) evidence is submitted to the jury" and other act "evidence should be admitted if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act." [685]
- FRE 104(b) allows the trial court to determine whether sufficient evidence has been introduced. Under this rule, "the trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence. The court simply examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence." [689-90]
|
| Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888) | FRE 501 (Attorney-Client Privilege) | - The attorney-client privilege "is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure." [470]
- Case is often cited to show that the attorney-client privilege is considered one of the oldest privileges.
|
| I |
| J |
| Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) | FRE 501 (Psychotherapist Privilege) | - Recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege
- "The psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem." [11]
- The psychotherapist privilege "covers confidential communications made to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists" as well as "licensed social workers in the course of psychotherapy." [15]
|
| K |
| Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) | FRE 702 (Testimony by Experts) | - Holding that Daubert applies not only to scientific testimony but also to technical and other specialized expert testimony [149]
- See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
|
| L |
| Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U. S. 116 (1999) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - "[A]ccomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule" [134 (plurality opinion)]
|
| Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984) | FRE 609 (Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime) | - Trial court decision that defendant could be impeached with his prior conviction was not cognizable on appeal because any harm from the challenged ruling was speculative since the defendant failed to testify.
- "We hold that to raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction [under FRE 609(a)], a defendant must testify." [43]
|
| M |
| Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- State interest in protecting the child abuse victim outweighed defendant's right to face accuser in court where confrontation was conducted via one-way closed circuit television, findings were made that use of procedure was necessary to protect child witness from trauma, the witness was under oath and subject to full cross-examination and victim's demeanor could be observed by judge, jury and defendant [840, 852-54]
- Confrontation clause allows use of hearsay statements against defendant because face-to-face confrontation at trial is not indispensable element of right to confront one's accusers when reliability is ensured through other means [846-50]
- Child abuse victim's testimony at trial via one-way closed circuit procedure did not implicate the purposes of the confrontation clause when the witness was competent to testify, did so under oath and defendant had full opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination, and judge, jury and defendant could view witness' demeanor by video monitor [850-52]
|
| Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
|
| Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 1143 (2011) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- "[H]old[ing] that the circumstances of the interaction between [the victim] ... and the police objectively indicate that the 'primary purpose of the interrogation' was 'to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.' Therefore, [the victim's] ... identification and description of the shooter and the location of the shooting were not testimonial statements, and their admission at Bryant’s trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause." (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006))
-
Further background information on the case is available on the Michigan v. Bryant Resource Page
-
See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
|
| Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. __, 130 S.Ct. 599 (2009) (No. 08-678) |
FRE 501 (Attorney-Client Privilege) | - Holding “that the collateral order doctrine” permitting a limited interlocutory appeal under Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949), “does not extend to disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege. Effective appellate review can be had by other means.” [130 S.Ct. 609]
|
| N |
| O |
| Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001) (Per Curiam) | Fifth Amendment (Privilege Against Self-Incrimination) | - "[W]e have never held ... that the privilege is unavailable to those who claim innocence. To the contrary, we have emphasized that one of the Fifth Amendment’s “basic functions . . . is to protect innocent men . . . ‘who
otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.’” [21 (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 421 (1957) (citation omitted))
- Rejecting state supreme court "determination that [defendant] Batt did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege because she denied any involvement in the abuse of the children"; She "had 'reasonable cause' to apprehend danger from her answers if questioned at respondent’s trial" and therefore had a valid claim to the privilege.
|
| Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Statement of an unavailable witness does not violate the Confrontation Clause as long as the statement (1) falls under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or (2) bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
- See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (landmark decision overturning Ohio v. Roberts, at least in part)
|
| Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998) | Fifth Amendment (Privilege Against Self-Incrimination) | - "We therefore hold that the Ohio clemency
interview, even on assumptions most favorable to respondent’s claim, does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination." [288]
|
| Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000) | FRE 609 (Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime) | - Holding "that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error" [760]
|
| Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) |
FRE 403 (Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time) |
- Holding in a felon in possession of a firearm case, that trial court abused its discretion in rejecting a defendant's offer to stipulate to his felon status and admitting the full record of a prior judgment (including the name or nature of the prior offense) when it enhanced the risk of a verdict based on prejudicial considerations and the purpose of the prior judgment was solely to prove the element of prior conviction
|
| P |
| Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Holding that “the right to confrontation is a trial right” and “[n]ormally the right to confront one’s accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses" [52 (emphasis in original)]
- "The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination." [51 (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U. S. 15, 18-19 (1985) (per curiam))]
- "Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose the [Children and Youth Services] file violated the Confrontation Clause." [54]
|
| Perry v. New Hampshire, _ U.S. _ (Jan. 11, 2012) (No. 10-8974) | Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) | - "When no improper law enforcement activity is involved, we hold, it suffices to test reliability through the rights and opportunities generally designed for that purpose, notably, the presence of counsel at post indictment lineups, vigorous cross-examination, protective rules of evidence, and jury instructions on both the fallibility of eyewitness identification and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
|
| Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause)
Fourteenth Amendment(Due Process Clause) | - "We hold today that the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." [403]
|
| Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000) | Fifth Amendment (Privilege Against Self-Incrimination)
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - A prosecutor's closing argument "call[ing] the jury’s attention to the fact that the defendant had the opportunity to hear all other witnesses testify and to tailor his testimony accordingly" did not violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment Sixth rights to be present at trial and confront witnesses, or the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process [63]
|
| Q |
| R |
| Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- In applying the Bruton rule, "the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence" [211]
|
| Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968) (per curiam)
| Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - “This case presents the question whether Bruton is to be applied retroactively. We hold that it is.” [293]
- “Although Bruton involved a federal prosecution and this is a state prosecution, the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment” [294]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
|
| Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) | FRE 501 (Qualified Law Enforcement Privilege) | - Recognizing a qualified privilege for some law enforcement activities and information including the identity of confidential informants
- The privilege “further[s] and protect[s] [ ] the public interest in effective law enforcement” [59-60]
|
| S |
| Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) | Fourthh Amendment (Unreasonable Search and Seizure)
Fifth Amendment (Privilege Against Self-Incrimination)
Sixth Amendment (Right to Counsel)
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) | - The extraction of a blood sample and the admission of the report of the chemical analysis of the sample (indicating intoxication) did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment; the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment; and the bar against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
|
| Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Concluding “any violation of Bruton that may have occurred at petitioner’s trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” [428]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
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| Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 1140 (2008) | FRE 401 and FRE 403 (Relevance; Exclusion of Relevant Evidence) |
- In employment discrimination action, circuit erred by conducting its own FRE 401/FRE 403 analysis without remanding the case to the trial court to make the determination in the first instance
- An abuse of discretion standard applies to FRE 401/FRE 403 rulings
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| Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) | FRE 501 (Attorney-Client Privilege) | - The attorney-client privilege survives the death of the holder of the privilege.
- Barring use of privileged communications for criminal investigation after the holder died.
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| Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985)
| Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Non-hearsay admission of confession for rebuttal purposes to prove what happened when the defendant confessed, not what happened at the murder scene, did not violate Confrontation Clause where sheriff testified about the statement [413-14]
- “The nonhearsay aspect of Peele's confession-not to prove what happened at the murder scene but to prove what happened when respondent confessed-raises no Confrontation Clause concerns”
- “The State introduced [Co-defendant’s] confession for the legitimate, non-hearsay purpose of rebutting respondent’s testimony that his own confession was a coerced copy of [Co-defendant’s] statement. The jury’s attention was directed to this distinctive and limited purpose by the prosecutor’s questions and closing argument. In this context, we hold that the trial judge’s instructions were the appropriate way to limit the jury’s use of that evidence in a manner consistent with the Confrontation Clause.” [417]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
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| Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995) | FRE 801(d)(1)(B) (Prior Consistent Statement) | - In admitting a prior consistent statement under FRE 801(d)(1)(B), "The Rule permits the introduction of a declarant's consistent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only when those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." [167]
- "Prior consistent statements may not be admitted to counter all forms of impeachment or to bolster the witness merely because she has been discredited." [157]
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| Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1827) | State Secrets Privilege | - Barring an action that may expose confidential information "to the serious detriment of the public" [107]
- "It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.... Much greater reason exists for the application of the principle to cases of contract for secret services with the government, as the existence of a contract of that kind is itself a fact not to be disclosed." [107]
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| Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) | FRE 501 (Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony) |
- Holding "that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying" [53]
- "Here, petitioner's spouse chose to testify against him. That she did so after a grant of immunity and assurances of lenient treatment does not render her testimony involuntary." [53]
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| United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) |
FRE 401 (Definition of "Relevant Evidence")
FRE 402 (Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible)
FRE 403 (Exclusion of Relevance on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time)
FRE 608 (Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness -- Specific Instances of Conduct)
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- In bank robbery trial, evidence of membership in prison gang was admissible; noting limiting instruction helped “ensure that the admission of this highly probative evidence did not unduly prejudice respondent” under FRE 403; “In an attempt to avoid undue prejudice to respondent the court ordered that the name ‘Aryan Brotherhood’ not be used.” [54]
- “A successful showing of bias on the part of a witness would have a tendency to make the facts to which he testified less probable in the eyes of the jury than it would be without such testimony” under FRE 401, FRE 402. [51]
- “Assessing the probative value of common membership in any particular group, and weighing any factors counseling against admissibility is a matter first for the district court's sound judgment under Rules 401 and 403 and ultimately, if the evidence is admitted, for the trier of fact.” [54]
- “[T]here is no rule of evidence which provides that testimony admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose is thereby rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case. It would be a strange rule of law which held that relevant, competent evidence which tended to show bias on the part of a witness was nonetheless inadmissible because it also tended to show that the witness was a liar. We intimate no view as to whether the evidence of Mills' membership in an organization having the tenets ascribed to the Aryan Brotherhood would be a specific instance of Mills' conduct which could not be proved against him by extrinsic evidence except as otherwise provided in Rule 608(b). It was enough that such evidence could properly be found admissible to show bias.” [56]
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| United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998) | Fifth Amendment (Privilege Against Self-Incrimination) | - "We hold that concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause." [669]
- The phrase "any criminal proceeding," under the Fifth Amendment, "provid[es] a witness with the right against compelled self-incrimination when reasonably fearing prosecution by the government whose power the Clause limits, but not otherwise." [673-74]
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| United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (“Doe I”) | Fifth Amendment (Privilege Against Self-Incrimination) | - Question Presented: "[W]hether, and to what extent, the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination applies to the business records of a sole proprietorship" [606]
- "A government subpoena compels the holder of the document to perform an act that may have testimonial aspects and an incriminating effect." [612]
- "The act of producing the documents at issue in this case is privileged and cannot be compelled without a statutory grant of use immunity pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003." [617]
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| United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992) | FRE 404(b) (Other Crimes, Wrongs, Or Acts) | - Holding that admission of FRE 404(b) evidence from an earlier trial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
- Rejecting rule "that the admission of evidence concerning a crime under Rule 404(b) constitutes prosecution for that crime" is barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. [387 & n.3]
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| United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1980) | FRE 501 (No State Legislator Privilege) | - “[W]e believe that recognition of an evidentiary privilege for state legislators for their legislative acts would impair the legitimate interest of the Federal Government in enforcing its criminal statutes, with only speculative benefit to the state legislative process.” [373]
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| United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980) | Sixth Amendment (Right to Assistance of Counsel) | - Question Presented: "[W]hether respondent's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel was violated by the admission at trial of incriminating statements made by respondent to his cellmate, an undisclosed Government informant, after indictment and while in custody." [265]
- "[W]e conclude that ... Henry's statements to Nichols should not have been admitted at trial. By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel." [274 (footnote omitted)]
- Distinguishing the use of "undercover agents to obtain incriminating statements from persons not in custody but suspected of criminal activity prior to the time charges are filed." [272]
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| United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000) | Fifth Amendment (Privilege Against Self-Incrimination) | - The act of production of records compelled by a subpoena "had a testimonial aspect, at least with respect to the existence and location of the documents" which implicated the Fifth Amendment and "could not be compelled .. without first receiving a grant of immunity...." [45]
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| United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986)
| Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - “[N]o showing is required that the declarant is unavailable for statements admitted under FRE 801(d)(2)(E) [400]
- “Cross-examination regarding [non-hearsay] … statements would contribute nothing to Confrontation Clause interests.” [398 n.11]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
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| United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 2313 (June 13, 2011) (No. 10-382) | FRE 501 (Attorney-Client Privilege) | - Under the “fiduciary exception” to the attorney-client privilege, a trustee may not withhold from the beneficiary communications between the trustee and attorneys retained by the trustee concerning trust management.
- Issue Presented: “[W]hether the fiduciary exception applies to the general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes.” [2318]
- Holding: The fiduciary exception does not apply. “Although the Government's responsibilities with respect to the management of funds belonging to Indian tribes bear some resemblance to those of a private trustee, … [t]he trust obligations of the United States to the Indian tribes are established and governed by statute rather than the common law, and in fulfilling its statutory duties, the Government acts not as a private trustee but pursuant to its sovereign interest in the execution of federal law. The reasons for the fiduciary exception—that the trustee has no independent interest in trust administration, and that the trustee is subject to a general common-law duty of disclosure -- do not apply in this context.” [2318]
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| United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995) | FRE 410 (Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements) | - A defendant may waive the exclusionary provisions of FRE 410 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6) which generally exclude plea negotiation statements made between a prosecutor and defendant
- "Nothing in the language of Rule 804(b)(1) suggests that a court may admit former testimony absent satisfaction of each of the Rule's elements." [321]
- Former testimony, including transcript from a grand jury proceeding, may not be introduced under FRE 804(b)(1) without a showing of "similar motive" as required under the rule [321-22]
- Remanding for determination whether defense satisfied "similar motive" requirement in seeking to use grand jury testimony of two witnesses who were unavailable due to privilege assertion and may have provided exculpatory testimony [321-22]
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| United States v. Mitchell, 526 U. S. 314 (1999) | Fifth Amendment (Privilege Against Self-Incrimination) | - A guilty plea does not waive the privilege against self-incrimination at sentencing. [321-25]
- The sentencing court could not draw an adverse inference based on the invocation of the privilege. [328-30]
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| United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) | FRE 501 (Executive Privilege) | - Noting qualified Executive Privilege.
- “The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.” [3110]
- President was required to submit to a subpoena duces tecum for tape recordings and documents requested in a criminal proceeding.
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| United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) | Plain Error Standard | - Establishing four-part plain error standard for review of an issue which a party failed to object to before the district court; this standard is now applied to evidence and other issues [732-35]
- See also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (applying Olano, standard to failure to object to trial court determining materiality in perjury trial)
- See also Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 173 L. Ed. 2d 266 (2009) (No. 07-9712) (applying Olano plain error standard to a claim that the government violated the terms of the plea agreement)
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| United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause)
FRE 801(d)(1)(C) (Prior Identification)
FRE 802 (Hearsay Rule)
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- "[W]e hold that neither the Confrontation Clause nor Federal Rule of Evidence 802 is violated by admission of an identification statement of a witness who is unable, because of a memory loss, to testify concerning the basis for the identification." [564]
- "Ordinarily a witness is regarded as 'subject to cross-examination' when he is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions. Just as with the constitutional prohibition, limitations on the scope of examination by the trial court or assertions of privilege by the witness may undermine the process to such a degree that meaningful cross-examination within the intent of the Rule no longer exists." [561-62]
- FRE 801(d)(1)(C) is not violated by admission of a prior, out-of-court identification statement of a witness who is unable, due to memory loss, to explain the basis for the identification. [563]
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| United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) | State Secrets Privilege | - Clarifying the State Secrets Privilege, which applies where "there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged." [10]
- "The privilege belongs to the Government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect." [7-8 (footnotes omitted)]
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| United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 (1992) | FRE 804(b)(1) (Former Testimony) | - Former testimony, including transcript from a grand jury proceeding, may not be introduced under FRE 804(b)(1) without a showing of "similar motive" as required under the rule [321-22]
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| United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) | FRE 501 (Attorney-Client Privilege)
See also FRE 104(a) (Preliminary Questions: Questions of admissibility generally) | - “We hold that in camera review may be used to determine whether allegedly privileged attorney-client communications fall within the crime-fraud exception. We further hold, however, that before a district court may engage in in camera review at the request of the party opposing the privilege, that party must present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that in camera review may yield evidence that establishes the exception's applicability. Finally, we hold that the threshold showing to obtain in camera review may be met by using any relevant evidence, lawfully obtained, that has not been adjudicated to be privileged.” [574]
- “We thus shall not adopt a reading of Rule 104(a) that would treat the contested communications as ‘privileged’ for purposes of the Rule, and we shall not interpret Rule 104(a) as categorically prohibiting the party opposing the privilege on crime-fraud grounds from relying on the results of an in camera review of the communications.” [568]
- Noting standard to trigger review under the crime-fraud exception: “Before engaging in in camera review to determine the applicability of the crime-fraud exception, the judge should require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person, that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies. Once that showing is made, the decision whether to engage in in camera review rests in the sound discretion of the district court.” . [572 (citation omitted)]
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| University Of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) | FRE 501 (No Peer Review Privilege) | - Declining to recognize “a new privilege against the disclosure of peer review materials” [189]
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| Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) | FRE 501 (Attorney-Client Privilege) | - Discussing the contours of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting
- Holding "the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice" and that the corporate attorney-client privilege must be able to reach "below officers and agents . . . responsible for directing" corporate affairs to learn facts relevant to the legal situation and to render advice [390, 391]
- Rejecting use of a "control group test" that protects communications from and to "only the senior management, guiding and integrating" the corporation, as frustrating the goals of the privilege to provide relevant information for legal advice [390]
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| W |
| Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) | Sixth Amendment (Compulsory Process Clause)
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) | - Issue Presented: "[W]hether the right of a defendant in a criminal case under the Sixth Amendment to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and whether that right was violated by a state procedural statute providing that persons charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories in the same crime cannot be introduced as witnesses for each other." [14-15 (footnotes omitted)]
- Holding: "We hold that the petitioner in this case was denied his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use." [23 (footnote omitted)]
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| Weisgram v. Marley, 528 U.S. 440 (2000) | FRE (In General)
FRE 702 (Testimony by Experts) | - Issue Presented: "Shorn of the erroneously admitted expert testimony, the record evidence is insufficient to justify a plaintiff ’s verdict. May the court of appeals then instruct the entry of judgment as a matter of law for defendant, or must that tribunal remand the case, leaving to the district court’s
discretion the choice between final judgment for defendant or a new trial of plaintiff ’s case?"
- "We ... hold that the authority of courts of appeals to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law extends to cases in which, on excision of testimony erroneously admitted, there remains insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict." [457]
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| White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause)
FRE 803(2) (Excited Utterance)
FRE 803(4) (Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment)
| - The “spontaneous declaration” (FRE 3(2)) and “medical examination” (FRE 803(4)) hearsay exceptions do not require the declarant to testify at trial or a trial court finding that the declarant is unavailable; "There can be no doubt that the two exceptions we consider in this case are 'firmly rooted'.” [355 n.8]
- Note: In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004), the Supreme Court called into question the continued vitality of White v. Illinois: “One case arguably in tension with the rule requiring a prior opportunity for cross-examination when the proffered statement is testimonial is White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), which involved, inter alia, the statements of a child victim to an investigating police officer admitted as spontaneous declarations.”; “Although our analysis in this case casts doubt on that holding, we need not definitively resolve whether it survives our decision today, because Sylvia Crawford’s statement is testimonial under any definition.”
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Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007)
[Slip Op.]
| Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Crawford v. Washington Confrontation Clause analysis does not apply retroactively on collateral review
- The second "watershed" exception did not apply under the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989)
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| Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) | FRE 804(b)(3) (Statement Against Interest) | - FRE 804(b)(3) only permits the admission of self-inculpatory statements, and not collateral statements [600]
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| Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 US 539 (1974) | Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause)
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - For state prison disciplinary proceedings, an inmate "should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals. Ordinarily, the right to present evidence is basic to a fair hearing; but the unrestricted right to call witnesses from the prison population carries obvious potential for disruption and for interference with the swift punishment that in individual cases may be essential to carrying out the correctional program of the institution." [566]
- However, "Confrontation and cross-examination present greater hazards to institutional interests.... These procedures are essential in criminal trials where the accused, if found guilty, may be subjected to the most serious deprivations, or where a person may lose his job in society. But they are not rights universally applicable to all hearings.... We think that the Constitution should not be read to impose the procedure at the present time and that adequate bases for decision in prison disciplinary cases can be arrived at without cross-examination." [567 (citations omitted)]
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The Key Evidence Cases Resource Page highlights noteworthy United States Supreme Court cases involving the Federal Rules of Evidence or other questions of evidence.