| Case | Rule | Significance |
|---|
| Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974) |
FRE 801(d)(2)(E)
(Co-Conspirator Statements) | - Under the second foundational requirement for 801(d)(2)(E), the co-conspirator statement must also be made during the course of the conspiracy. [218-19]
- “The ongoing conspiracy requirement is … inapplicable to evidence, such as that of acts of alleged conspirators, which would not otherwise be hearsay” when offered “to prove the existence of the conspiracy.” [219]
- Statements were non-hearsay when offered “to prove that the statements were made so as to establish a foundation for later showing, through other admissible evidence, that they were false.” [220 (footnotes omitted)]
|
| Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988) | FRE 803(8) (Public Records and Reports)
see also FRE 106 (Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements)
FRE 401 (Definition of "Relevant Evidence") | - Resolving a "longstanding conflict" and holding that public investigative reports under FRE 803(8)(C) "are not inadmissible merely because they state a conclusion or opinion." [170]
- "As long as the conclusion is based on a factual investigation and satisfies the Rule's trustworthiness requirement, it should be admissible along with other portions of the report." [170 (footnote omitted)]
- On a separate issue, jury "was given a distorted and prejudicial impression" of a letter where trial court restricted cross-examination concerning the letter and the jury was denied "a more complete picture of" the communication. [170] Because the completeness-information was relevant under FRE 401, it was unnecessary to decide whether FRE 106, codifying the rule of completeness, applied. [172]
|
| Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause)
FRE 801(d)(2)(E) (Co-Conspirator Statements) | - Holding that where the requirements of FRE 801(d)(2)(E) are satisfied, no Confrontation Clause issues are raised
- Clarifying that the proponent holds the burden to show the admissibility of the FRE 801(d)(2)(E) evidence by a preponderance of the evidence [182-84]
|
| Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Holding that a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights were violated when a non-testifying codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant is introduced at their joint trial, despite the judge’s jury instruction that the confession was only to be considered against the codefendant. [126]
|
| Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) | Harmless Error Standard | - Holding that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" [24]
- See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7, 15 (1999) (under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the court reviews "whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained") (quotations omitted)
- See also Delaware v. Van Arsdale, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (remanding to Delaware Supreme Court to determine whether Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
|
| Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Confrontation clause provides the criminal defendant a right to "confront" face-to-face any witnesses giving evidence against him at trial [1019-20]
- Use of a screen between defendant and child sexual assault victim during victim's testimony violated defendant's confrontation clause rights because the screen allowed the witness to avoid viewing the defendant during the victim's testimony [1020-22]
|
| Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Landmark Confrontation Clause case holding that "testimonial" statements of an unavailable witness violated the Confrontation Clause unless there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination
- Leaving open the definition of "testimonial" evidence but noting "testimonial" statements at minimum includes statements made to law enforcement officials engaged "in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial" such as "affidavits, custodial examinations, . . . affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." [51, 56 n.7]
- Supreme Court overturned precedent that had been applied for nearly a quarter of a century, including Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (applying "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" standard to admit statements of an unavailable witness)
- See also Lead Story: After Crawford v. Washington: Early Observations On the Admissibility of Evidence Under the Confrontation Clause, 1 Fed. Evid. R. 83 (Sept. 2004)
- Analysis of key Crawford issues available in the Federal Evidence Review’s Crawford Watch: Status of Crawford Issues
- See also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006)
|
| Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - “We hold that, where a nontestifying codefendant's confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant, the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even if the defendant's own confession is admitted against him.” [193 (citation omitted)]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
|
| Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 1029 (2008) | FRE 403 (Exclusion of Relevance on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time); FRE 401 (Definition of "Relevant" Evidence) |
- While Crawford v. Washington, as a new constitutional rule, does not apply retroactively in federal proceedings, state courts are not constrained in adopting broader new criminal rules that apply in state proceedings
|
| Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) | FRE 702 (Testimony by Experts) |
- FRE 702 imposes "gatekeeping" role for trial court to admit expert scientific testimony, including that expert evidence is not only relevant, but reliable and assists trier of fact
- Concluding FRE 702 displaced "general acceptance" to admit expert testimony under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923)
- See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extending Daubert to technical and other specialized expert testimony)
|
| Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Victim's response to 911 operator's interrogation was not "testimonial" and not subject to Confrontation Clause because the statement was made under circumstances that objectively indicated an ongoing emergency and the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable police to assist in meeting that emergency [823]
- Victim's written statements in affidavit given to police officer were testimonial and excludable under the Confrontation Clause because no emergency existed at the time of the statement and the primary purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a past crime [830]
- A defendant who obtains absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits Confrontation Clause rights, noting FRE 804(b)(6) (Forfeiture by Wrongdoing) [833]
- See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
|
| Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) | FRE 501 (Attorney-Client Privilege) | - The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is "to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys." [403]
|
| General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) |
FRE 702 (Testimony by Experts) | - Holding "that abuse of discretion is the proper standard by which to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence." [141]
|
| Giles v. California, 554 U.S. _, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- The forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause requires the government to show that "the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying"
- Case was remanded to apply appropriate standard
|
| Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Redaction of co-defendant’s confession by replacing a proper name with a blank space or the word "deleted" violated the Bruton rule as the jury could conclude the redactions refer to the defendant
|
| Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) | Work Product Doctrine | - A common companion to attorney-client privilege is the work product doctrine which safeguards “[m]aterials obtained or prepared by an adversary’s counsel with an eye toward litigation.” [511]
- See also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (work product rule: noting “the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation”)
|
| Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause or Compulsory Process Clause) (meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense)
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense)
FRE 403 (Exclusion of Relevance on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time) | - Evidence rule barring the defense from introducing proof of third-party guilt on the basis of the strength of the government’s case “violates a criminal defendant’s right to have ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” [331 (other citation omitted)]
- Also noting: “While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 403.” [326 (other citations omitted)]
|
| Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) | FRE 404(b) (Other Crimes, Wrongs, Or Acts)
FRE 104(b) (Relevancy Conditioned On Fact) | - Resolving a circuit conflict and holding the trial court need not "make a preliminary finding before 'similar act' and other Rule 404(b) evidence is submitted to the jury" and other act "evidence should be admitted if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act." [685]
- FRE 104(b) allows the trial court to determine whether sufficient evidence has been introduced. Under this rule, "the trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence. The court simply examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence." [689-90]
|
| Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888) | (Attorney-Client Privilege) | - The attorney-client privilege "is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure." [470]
- Case is often cited to show that the attorney-client privilege is considered one of the oldest privileges.
|
| Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) | FRE 501 (Psychotherapist Privilege) | - Recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege
- "The psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem." [11]
- The psychotherapist privilege "covers confidential communications made to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists" as well as "licensed social workers in the course of psychotherapy." [15]
|
| Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) | FRE 702 (Testimony by Experts) | - Holding that Daubert applies not only to scientific testimony but also to technical and other specialized expert testimony [149]
- See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
|
| Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984) | FRE 609 (Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime) | - Trial court decision that defendant could be impeached with his prior conviction was not cognizable on appeal because any harm from the challenged ruling was speculative since the defendant failed to testify.
- "We hold that to raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction [under FRE 609(a)], a defendant must testify." [43]
|
| Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- State interest in protecting the child abuse victim outweighed defendant's right to face accuser in court where confrontation was conducted via one-way closed circuit television, findings were made that use of procedure was necessary to protect child witness from trauma, the witness was under oath and subject to full cross-examination and victim's demeanor could be observed by judge, jury and defendant [840, 852-54]
- Confrontation clause allows use of hearsay statements against defendant because face-to-face confrontation at trial is not indispensable element of right to confront one's accusers when reliability is ensured through other means [846-50]
- Child abuse victim's testimony at trial via one-way closed circuit procedure did not implicate the purposes of the confrontation clause when the witness was competent to testify, did so under oath and defendant had full opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination, and judge, jury and defendant could view witness' demeanor by video monitor [850-52]
|
| Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (June 25, 2009) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Certificates of forensic analysis are "testimonial" and "the Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits."
- Further background information on the case is available on the Melendez-Diaz Resource Page.
|
| Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. __, 130 S.Ct. 599 (2009) (No. 08-678) |
FRE 501 (Attorney-Client Privilege) | Holding “that the collateral order doctrine” permitting a limited interlocutory appeal under Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949), “does not extend to disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege. Effective appellate review can be had by other means.” [558 S.Ct. 609] |
| Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Statement of an unavailable witness does not violate the Confrontation Clause as long as the statement (1) falls under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or (2) bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
- See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (landmark decision overturning Ohio v. Roberts, at least in part)
|
| Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000) | FRE 609 (Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime) | - Holding "that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error" [760]
|
| Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) |
FRE 403 (Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time) |
- Holding in a felon in possession of a firearm case, that trial court abused its discretion in rejecting a defendant's offer to stipulate to his felon status and admitting the full record of a prior judgment (including the name or nature of the prior offense) when it enhanced the risk of a verdict based on prejudicial considerations and the purpose of the prior judgment was solely to prove the element of prior conviction
|
|
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- In applying the Bruton rule, "the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence" [211]
|
|
Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968) (per curiam)
| Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - “This case presents the question whether Bruton is to be applied retroactively. We hold that it is.” [293]
- “Although Bruton involved a federal prosecution and this is a state prosecution, the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment” [294]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
|
|
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Concluding “any violation of Bruton that may have occurred at petitioner’s trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” [428]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
|
| Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 1140 (2008) | FRE 401 and FRE 403 (Relevance; Exclusion of Relevant Evidence) |
- In employment discrimination action, circuit erred by conducting its own FRE 401/FRE 403 analysis without remanding the case to the trial court to make the determination in the first instance
- An abuse of discretion standard applies to FRE 401/FRE 403 rulings
|
| Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) | FRE 501 (Attorney-Client Privilege) | - The attorney-client privilege survives the death of the holder of the privilege.
- Barring use of privileged communications for criminal investigation after the holder died.
|
|
Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985)
| Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Non-hearsay admission of confession for rebuttal purposes to prove what happened when the defendant confessed, not what happened at the murder scene, did not violate Confrontation Clause where sheriff testified about the statement [413-14]
- “The nonhearsay aspect of Peele's confession-not to prove what happened at the murder scene but to prove what happened when respondent confessed-raises no Confrontation Clause concerns”
- “The State introduced [Co-defendant’s] confession for the legitimate, non-hearsay purpose of rebutting respondent’s testimony that his own confession was a coerced copy of [Co-defendant’s] statement. The jury’s attention was directed to this distinctive and limited purpose by the prosecutor’s questions and closing argument. In this context, we hold that the trial judge’s instructions were the appropriate way to limit the jury’s use of that evidence in a manner consistent with the Confrontation Clause.” [417]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
|
| Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995) | FRE 801(d)(1)(B) (Prior Consistent Statement) | - In admitting a prior consistent statement under FRE 801(d)(1)(B), "The Rule permits the introduction of a declarant's consistent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only when those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." [167]
- "Prior consistent statements may not be admitted to counter all forms of impeachment or to bolster the witness merely because she has been discredited." [157]
|
| Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) | FRE 501 (Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony) |
- Holding "that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying" [53]
- "Here, petitioner's spouse chose to testify against him. That she did so after a grant of immunity and assurances of lenient treatment does not render her testimony involuntary." [53]
|
| United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) |
FRE 401 (Definition of "Relevant Evidence")
FRE 402 (Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible)
FRE 403 (Exclusion of Relevance on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time)
FRE 608 (Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness -- Specific Instances of Conduct)
|
- In bank robbery trial, evidence of membership in prison gang was admissible; noting limiting instruction helped “ensure that the admission of this highly probative evidence did not unduly prejudice respondent” under FRE 403; “In an attempt to avoid undue prejudice to respondent the court ordered that the name ‘Aryan Brotherhood’ not be used.” [54]
- “A successful showing of bias on the part of a witness would have a tendency to make the facts to which he testified less probable in the eyes of the jury than it would be without such testimony” under FRE 401, FRE 402. [51]
- “Assessing the probative value of common membership in any particular group, and weighing any factors counseling against admissibility is a matter first for the district court's sound judgment under Rules 401 and 403 and ultimately, if the evidence is admitted, for the trier of fact.” [54]
- “[T]here is no rule of evidence which provides that testimony admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose is thereby rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case. It would be a strange rule of law which held that relevant, competent evidence which tended to show bias on the part of a witness was nonetheless inadmissible because it also tended to show that the witness was a liar. We intimate no view as to whether the evidence of Mills' membership in an organization having the tenets ascribed to the Aryan Brotherhood would be a specific instance of Mills' conduct which could not be proved against him by extrinsic evidence except as otherwise provided in Rule 608(b). It was enough that such evidence could properly be found admissible to show bias.” [56]
|
| United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992) | FRE 404(b) (Other Crimes, Wrongs, Or Acts) |
- Holding that admission of FRE 404(b) evidence from an earlier trial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
- Rejecting rule "that the admission of evidence concerning a crime under Rule 404(b) constitutes prosecution for that crime" is barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. [387 & n.3]
|
| United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1980) |
FRE 501 (No State Legislator Privilege) | - “[W]e believe that recognition of an evidentiary privilege for state legislators for their legislative acts would impair the legitimate interest of the Federal Government in enforcing its criminal statutes, with only speculative benefit to the state legislative process.” [373]
|
|
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986)
| Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - “[N]o showing is required that the declarant is unavailable for statements admitted under FRE 801(d)(2)(E) [400]
- “Cross-examination regarding [non-hearsay] … statements would contribute nothing to Confrontation Clause interests.” [398 n.11]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
|
| United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995) | FRE 410 (Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements) | - A defendant may waive the exclusionary provisions of FRE 410 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6) which generally exclude plea negotiation statements made between a prosecutor and defendant
- "Nothing in the language of Rule 804(b)(1) suggests that a court may admit former testimony absent satisfaction of each of the Rule's elements." [321]
- Former testimony, including transcript from a grand jury proceeding, may not be introduced under FRE 804(b)(1) without a showing of "similar motive" as required under the rule [321-22]
- Remanding for determination whether defense satisfied "similar motive" requirement in seeking to use grand jury testimony of two witnesses who were unavailable due to privilege assertion and may have provided exculpatory testimony [321-22]
|
| United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) | FRE 501 (Executive Privilege) | - Noting qualified Executive Privilege.
- “The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.” [3110]
- President was required to submit to a subpoena duces tecum for tape recordings and documents requested in a criminal proceeding.
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| United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) | Plain Error Standard | - Establishing four-part plain error standard for review of an issue which a party failed to object to before the district court; this standard is now applied to evidence and other issues [732-35]
- See also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (applying Olano, standard to failure to object to trial court determining materiality in perjury trial)
- See also Puckett v. United States, _ U.S. _, _ S.Ct. _ (2009) (No. 07-9712) (applying Olano plain error standard to a claim that the government violated the terms of the plea agreement)
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| United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 (1992) | FRE 804(b)(1) (Former Testimony) | - Former testimony, including transcript from a grand jury proceeding, may not be introduced under FRE 804(b)(1) without a showing of "similar motive" as required under the rule [321-22]
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| United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) | FRE 501 (Attorney-Client Privilege)
See also FRE 104(a) (Preliminary Questions: Questions of admissibility generally) | - “We hold that in camera review may be used to determine whether allegedly privileged attorney-client communications fall within the crime-fraud exception. We further hold, however, that before a district court may engage in in camera review at the request of the party opposing the privilege, that party must present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that in camera review may yield evidence that establishes the exception's applicability. Finally, we hold that the threshold showing to obtain in camera review may be met by using any relevant evidence, lawfully obtained, that has not been adjudicated to be privileged.” [574]
-
“We thus shall not adopt a reading of Rule 104(a) that would treat the contested communications as ‘privileged’ for purposes of the Rule, and we shall not interpret Rule 104(a) as categorically prohibiting the party opposing the privilege on crime-fraud grounds from relying on the results of an in camera review of the communications.” [568]
-
Noting standard to trigger review under the crime-fraud exception: “Before engaging in in camera review to determine the applicability of the crime-fraud exception, the judge should require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person, that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies. Once that showing is made, the decision whether to engage in in camera review rests in the sound discretion of the district court.” . [572 (citation omitted)]
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| University Of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) | FRE 501 (No Peer Review Privilege) | - Declining to recognize “a new privilege against the disclosure of peer review materials” [189]
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| Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) | FRE 501 (Attorney-Client Privilege) | - Discussing the contours of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting
- Holding "the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice" and that the corporate attorney-client privilege must be able to reach "below officers and agents . . . responsible for directing" corporate affairs to learn facts relevant to the legal situation and to render advice [390, 391]
- Rejecting use of a "control group test" that protects communications from and to "only the senior management, guiding and integrating" the corporation, as frustrating the goals of the privilege to provide relevant information for legal advice [390]
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| Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 127 S.Ct. 1173 (2007) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Crawford Confrontation Clause analysis does not apply retroactively on collateral review
- The second "watershed" exception did not apply under the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989)
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| Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) | FRE 804(b)(3) (Statement Against Interest) | - FRE 804(b)(3) only permits the admission of self-inculpatory statements, and not collateral statements [600]
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