Federal Evidence Review

In insurance fraud prosecution, trial court refusal to continue the trial so that a jailed witness could be transported to testify for the defendant did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Compulsory Process; the balance of the interest in the efficient administration of justice outweighed the defendant’s witness request, which was made shortly before the trial, in United States v. Sparkman, 500 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. Sept. 6, 2007) (No. 06-3520)

A defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Compulsory Process is not absolute. Rather, the defendant's constitutional right to compel the testimony of witnesses in his favor is to be balanced against the public interest. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1988) (In balancing the defendant’s right to compulsory process, the court should consider the “integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process.”). As noted once by the Seventh Circuit, courts employ "[n]o hard and fast rule ... to strike the balance between the competing interests. No one doubts that criminal defendants like other parties to litigation can be subjected to reasonable rules regulating discovery. The central aim of such rules is to minimize surprise at trial by requiring disclosure of witnesses in advance of trial. The rules are empty if they cannot be enforced." Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 444-45 (7th Cir. 1995) (habeas review of state rape conviction in which state trial court excluded defense witnesses).

How to strike the balance under the Sixth Amendment was considered by the Eighth Circuit. In the case, Defendant Sparkman, co-owner of a used car business and an office building, suffered the destruction of the office building by fire and two unsold vehicles from the lot were taken and “burned near a rock quarry.” While it was clear that the fires were related and intentionally set, investigators could not identify the perpetrator. The defendant’s alibi was that he was with an employee, Smith, at the time of the fire.

Three years after the fire, the alibi witness Smith pled guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine and after sentencing, was interviewed by an ATF agent. Smith told the agent – and later testified at the defendant’s trial – that on the day of the fire he saw the defendant “carrying a gallon-sized container” supposedly full of gasoline toward the office building shortly before the fire and that he witnessed the defendant set the two vehicles on fire. The defendant was charged with insurance fraud.

While in jail, witness Smith met “longtime friend” Furr. The same ATF agent who had obtained the Smith's statement also interviewed Furr. In his report, the agent summarized that during the interview, “Furr stated that Smith had told him that he had burned the West Park Motors office himself at Sparkman’s request.” a href="http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2007/09-September/US_v._Sparkman.pdf">Sparkman, 500 F.3d at 681. Furr's incarceration was still in effect at the time of defendant Sparkman’s trial and the defendant requested the prosecution produce Furr to testify for the defense “shortly before trial.” The marshals indicated that there was “insufficient” time to move the prisoner and he was not produced. The defendant was convicted and appealed, contending he was denied his constitutional right to compulsory process to aid his defense by having the impeachment witness appear.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision not to compel the attendance of incarcerated witness Furr. The defendant had failed to make a timely request for the prisoner’s testimony, noted he circuit. The defendant had “asked the prosecutor to arrange for Furr’s appearance no more than seven business days before trial (although the request should have been directed to the United States Marshals Service), and the prosecutor communicated that request to the Marshals Service five business days before trial.” Sparkman, 500 F.3d at 682.

However, the Marshals Service lacked sufficient time to transfer the prisoner from Colorado to the trial in Missouri. As the circuit noted:

Sparkman’s counsel was aware of Furr’s imprisonment and thus could have anticipated that transporting him to trial would require significant lead time. The court has a substantial interest in the efficient administration of justice, and we would not lightly conclude that the court was required to continue a trial due to a timing problem that was largely of the defendant’s own making.

But even had the court violated the Sixth Amendment to compulsory process, the circuit reasoned that this error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This was because cooperating witness Smith gave two different accounts about the events of the fire – either that the defendant burned the buildings himself or that the defendant directed Smith to burn the buildings. Either account was still “consistent regarding Sparkman’s guilt. In view of the modest benefit that Furr’s testimony might have offered, we believe the district court correctly ruled that the countervailing public interests in the efficient administration of justice were sufficient reason to deny the motion for a continuance of the trial.” Sparkman, 500 F.3d at 683.