In firearm malfunction product liability action, testimony explaining the reasons for the company’s marking process was non-hearsay as it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and was accompanied by the trial court’s limiting instructions to the jury, in Katzenmeier v. Blackpowder Products, Inc., _ F.3d _ (8th Cir. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 09-1146)
In the case, the plaintiff Katzenmeier’s father gave him a muzzleloader rifle as a Christmas gift. The first time the muzzleloader was fired, it exploded injuring the plaintiff. He brought a products liability action against the rifle manufacturer and distributor. His wife claimed a loss of consortium. At trial, executives of the designer and manufacturer of the muzzleloading firearms testified about the process in which the emblem of the House of Eibar was placed on the firearm. The testimony arose when one witness was questioned about “the policy decision or reason” about why the company “did not proof test the guns.” The response was that “This is not our company’s decision. This is the decision of the Proofhouse of Eibar. We must do what the proofhouse tells us to do.” In deposition testimony another company official explained that the reason the emblem was added was because “the proof house told us to do that.” Katzenmeier, _ F.3d at _. Before the testimony, the trial court instructed the jury that this testimony could not be considered for the truth of the matter. After the case was presented to a jury, the court dismissed the loss of consortium claim and the jury returned a defense verdict. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the testimony concerning the placement of the emblem as inadmissible hearsay.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the admission of the testimony as non-hearsay. Instructions to add the emblem was not hearsay. Katzenmeier, _ F.3d at _ (citing United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1410 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Instructions to an individual to do something are . . . not hearsay . . . because they are not declarations of fact and therefore are not capable of being true of false.”) (citations omitted)). The circuit agreed that the testimony was not offered “for the truth of what the proof house said, but rather to demonstrate the reasons for the company’s marking procedures.” Therefore, the challenged testimony was not hearsay under FRE 801©. Finally, the circuit noted the presumption that juries follow the trial court’s instructions. Katzenmeier, _ F.3d at _ (citing United States v. Sandstrom, 594 F.3d 634, 645 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted))).
The Katzenmeier opinion highlights the practice and use of admitting non-hearsay testimony. The trial court provided the jury with a limiting instruction concerning the testimony. Absent unusual circumstances, juries are presumed to abide by the court’s instructions. Additionally, non-hearsay reasons were provided for the testimony. Generally, an imperative or instruction is not considered hearsay. See generally Imperative To Tell The Truth Was Not A Hearsay Statement. Further, the explanation on the reason for the process was not hearsay.
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