Eighth Circuit concludes the names of the prior convictions (for possession of crack cocaine and as a felon in possession of a firearm) were relevant to show the prior felonies qualified under the statute and were marginally prejudicial since the jury could learn there was more than one felony and given the burden of the government to show the nature of the felony, in United States v. Banks, 553 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. Feb. 2, 2009) (No. 08-2511)
When a defendant declines to stipulate to his prior felony conviction in a felon in possession of a firearm case, can the trial court admit the names of the prior felonies or limit the evidence to the fact that the defendant was convicted by a felony of imprisonment by more than one year? The Eighth Circuit recently addressed this issue and affirmed the trial court’s admission of the evidence.
In the case, officers stopped defendant Banks after noticing he was riding his bike at about 1:40 a.m. without a headlamp. While frisking the defendant for officer safety, one officer felt a pistol in the right front pants pocket. The defendant mentioned it was a “gun,” which was retrieved. The defendant was arrested and charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. He had two prior convictions including one 1994 for possession of crack cocaine and another in 1996 as a felon in possession of a firearm.
Before trial, the defendant moved to exclude the names of the convictions and limit any reference “to the fact of a conviction punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.” Banks, 553 F.3d at 1103-04. The trial court denied the motion concluding “that the government could not meet its burden of proof without the names of the prior felonies because certain felonies cannot be used to support a felon-in-possession charge.” The names were not unfairly prejudicial since the jury could learn there was more than one felony and the prejudice was marginal in learning what the felonies were for given the government burden to establish a qualifying felony. After his jury trial conviction, the defendant appealed the denial of his motion his motion on grounds that the names were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the admission of the names of the defendant’s prior felony convictions. As the circuit explained:
“Banks was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for ‘any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.’ But 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) excludes from the definition of a ‘crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’ certain crimes, including ‘antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade . . . or . . . any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.’ The government needed to prove, therefore, that Banks’s prior crimes triggered the conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm.”
Banks, 553 F.3d at 1106.
In addition to being relevant, the circuit also agreed with the analysis of the trial court that the prejudice was marginal, noting: “In light of the district court’s reasoned analysis and the significant deference we afford a district court in conducting the rule 403 balancing, we decline to say that the district court abused its discretion. Further, the district court gave the jury a limiting instruction, which stated that the jury may use the evidence of the prior felonies only for purpose of determining whether the government met its burden of proof.” Banks, 553 F.3d at 1107.
